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Varieties of US Post-Cold War Imperialism: Anatomy of a Failed 
Hegemonic Project and the Future of US Geopolitics  
  
Naná de Graaff & Bastiaan van Apeldoorn 




Seeking to understand the variations of US 
post-Cold War imperialism, this article offers 
an explanation of the changes that have taken 
place in US geopolitical strategy since the 
early 2000s. Our central argument is that to 
make sense of these changes within 
underlying continuities we need to analyse the 
dialectical interplay between political agency 
-- in turn linked to specific social forces -- on 
the one hand, and changing structural 
conditions within the global political 
economy on the other. Adopting a neo-
Gramscian approach we argue how 
geopolitical strategy is constructed through a 
network of actors whose practices are shaped by their own social positions as well as by the 
broader global structural context. Analysing these networks with Social Network Analysis we 
show how neoconservative intellectuals -- linked to dominant sections of US capital -- came 
to formulate a hegemonic project for the preservation of US primacy in the context of the 
rising contradictions of US-led neoliberal globalization. The ultimate failure of this 
hegemonic project, especially its failure to address the shortcomings of the still hegemonic 
neoliberal accumulation strategy, subsequently set the structural context in which the network 
around President Obama is now trying to formulate a more effective strategy. 
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‘Change, yes we can!’ has proven to be a winning slogan in US politics. The question to 
which extent President Obama is indeed effectuating a significant change with regard to the 
role of the US within the current world order -- breaking with his predecessor who himself 
has been associated with a radical shift in US strategy – continues to be disputed. Whereas 
some stress what they see as fundamental change, a view that was of course expressed most 
emphatically by the Norwegian Nobel Committee, others emphasize continuity (cf. Lynch 
and Singh, 2008). A similar question has also been central to a recent academic debate about 
the extent to which a ‘new’ US imperialism has been emerging since 9/11. In this article, we 
argue that indeed important underlying continuities can be discerned within US geopolitical 
strategy since the end of the Cold, but that we also need to recognize and be able to explain 
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the changes that have taken place within those continuities. We are thus interested in 
explaining the variations of US post-Cold War geopolitical strategy. More specifically, in this 
article we seek to explain those changes that have taken place in the early 2000s under the 
Bush presidency, while extending this analysis to the Obama presidency in what necessarily 
has to remain a preliminary assessment. Our central argument is that if we want to make sense 
of the ‘changes within continuity’ we need to analyse the dialectical interplay between 
political agency – which we see as rooted specific social forces -- on the one hand, and 
changing structural conditions, inherent within the global political economy, on the other. We 
see this political agency as embedded in particular class structures and operating within and 
constituting links between the state apparatus, policy planning groups, and the corporate 
world (cf. Domhoff, 2009).  
Drawing upon a historical materialist understanding of geopolitics that sees interstate 
relations and rivalry as internally related to capitalist social relations, geopolitical strategy is 
here understood as to include geo-economic strategy. Whereas geopolitical strategy is often 
primarily identified with territorial power projection and security issues, the latter is more 
associated with foreign economic policies and strategies of non-territorial power projection 
(even if enabled by the power of a territorial state; for instance in opening up foreign markets, 
etc.). We do, however, see geopolitical and geo-economic strategy as fundamentally 
interrelated and as forming an integral part of capitalist imperialism.1
This article proceeds as follows. The first section below starts with a brief review of the 
various attempts to theorize the ‘new imperialism’ with which the US foreign policy under 
Bush Jr. has become associated. We will conclude that although enlightening, these 
explanations are incomplete and above all ignore the role of agency. Seeking to go beyond the 
current literature we adopt a neo-Gramscian approach that emphasizes how geopolitical 
strategy is actually constructed by what we denote as a hegemonic project through a network 
of actors, whose practices, however, are in turn shaped by a) their own social positions and 
the related interests; b) the broader global structural context within which they operate. The 
latter, however, must be viewed as in part, the product of past geopolitical strategies. From 
this perspective we will argue that inasmuch Bush has represented change vis-à-vis Clinton, 
just as much as Obama may represent change vis-à-vis Bush, these changes must be 
interpreted in terms of different responses to the deepening contradictions of the process of 
neoliberal globalization, which the US has led since the end of the Cold War. The second 
section therefore outlines how the strategy of neoliberal globalization as pursued under 
Clinton ran into several contradictions, which subsequently the neoconservative project 
sought to formulate a response to.  
 Yet, for the sake of 
simplicity in the following we use the term ‘geopolitical strategy’ as shorthand for both 
aspects. 
Far from determining the outcome, however, the geopolitical and geo-economic 
changes that we identify in the second section have only made the neoconservative turn 
possible. How it in fact emerged as a hegemonic concept for the geopolitical strategy of the 
US can only be analysed with reference to the agency of social and political forces. 
Employing the methodology of Social Network Analysis we will therefore in the third section 
map what we identify as networks of neoconservative intellectuals and policy-advisers and 
analyse the strategies they pursued. This analysis will demonstrate that the neoconservatives 
were no free-floating intellectuals but were closely linked to the government and also tied to, 
and supported by, dominant sections of US transnational capital. In fact, seeking to advance 
those capitalist class interests, the neoconservative project, we argue, remained firmly 
committed to the accumulation strategy that had previously underpinned the neoliberal 
globalization project, compensating for the erosion of consent for neoliberal globalization by 
emphasising coercion in the geopolitical realm. As such, we interpret the ‘neoconservative 
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moment’ as a hegemonic project for the continuation of US imperialism in the context of its 
rising contradictions.  
While this strategy itself has done little in slowing down the structural decline of US 
power -- and arguably has done the opposite -- we suggest that the underlying problem has 
been the failure to articulate a new successful US-centred accumulation strategy with the 
project for a ‘new American century’. As has become obvious within the context of the 
current global financial and economic crisis, this is now indeed the biggest problem faced by 
Obama. In the final section, then, we will assess the limits of the possible for US geopolitical 
strategy under Obama, by combining an account of the structural conditions his 
administration inherits with a social network analysis of the agents who actually have to 
implement ‘change’. We conclude that far from marking a radical break with Bush, Obama 
will be struggling to find a more effective response to the continuing contradictions of and 
challenges to US power while continuing to be committed to the goal of US primacy.  
 
 
Theorizing the ‘New Imperialism’  
 
It has been the Bush presidency, and the policies it adopted in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, which sparked an enormous interest in the question of change within US geopolitical 
strategy, and produced a huge literature seeking to account for that change. Within 
mainstream International Relations, the rationalist mainstream regards the foreign policy of 
Bush Jr. as a temporary aberration from what we would normally expect from a supposedly 
rational actor. Thus, from a neoliberal perspective John Ikenberry already in 2004 predicted a 
speedy return to the multilateral path that characterized the post-war era of US ‘benign’ 
hegemony (Ikenberry, 2004). For neorealists too the problem has been that US foreign policy 
behaviour under Bush contradicted their theoretical predictions, according to which the 
rational strategy to ‘preserve’ the post-Cold War ‘unipolar moment’ would be to play the role 
of an offshore balancer (Layne, 2006).  Thus, both defensive and offensive realists have been 
unified in their strong criticism of the Bush doctrine, and in particular have condemned the 
Iraq war as an ‘unnecessary war’ (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003).  
Treating the geopolitical strategy under Bush thus as an anomaly, however, not only 
misses the important degree of continuity with respect to preceding US strategy, but above all 
wrongly suggests that the observed variation defies rational explanation. In this respect, recent 
historical materialist work on what is seen as the ‘new’ US imperialism offers a more 
promising avenue towards an understanding of the shift(s) of US geopolitical strategy since 
the turn of the millennium.  
 
 
Continuity and Change in US Imperialism: Historical Materialist Perspectives 
 
Within the revived historical materialist literature on theorising (capitalist) imperialism, a key 
dividing line pertains to the question  whether or not the ‘imperial project’ of the Bush years 
represented anything new, or whether it was in fact the same old imperialist policies that the 
US has pursued since at least 1945. Representing a sophisticated version of the continuity 
thesis Ellen Wood argues that the Bush doctrine maybe madness but that it is a ‘madness 
firmly rooted not only in the past half-century of US history but in the systemic logic of 
capitalism’ (Wood, 2003: XVI; for a similar view see Panitch and Gindin, 2005). Although 
correctly pointing to some enduring continuities in US imperialism, the problem with this 
account is that it cannot explain the changes within these continuities.  
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 In his influential account, David Harvey (2003) stresses both continuity and change,                
locating the origins of what he calls the ‘new imperialism’ in the 1970s and views it as a 
response to the then unfolding crisis of overaccumulation. US imperialism of the 2000s here 
represents a shift within that ‘new imperialism’ because neoliberal imperialism ‘was 
weakening on the inside’ (Harvey, 2003: 190). Within the dialectical relationship between 
what Harvey (Ibid., 27-30) identifies as the ‘capitalist logic’ and the ‘territorial logic’ of 
power, there was thus a shift from ‘consent to coercion’ with the rise of neoconservative 
imperialism.2
 Arrighi’s (2005) analysis of the unravelling of US hegemony represents the clearest 
example of the ‘change thesis’, a change from the liberal internationalism of the Clinton 
years, and more generally a break with the whole tradition of US hegemony in the post-war 
era. According to Arrighi neoconservatism is above all rooted in the structural changes in the 
global political economy and the US’s position within it. Here the neoconservative project 
becomes a response to the structural and inevitable decline of US hegemony, indeed a 
desperate attempt to cling on to it by playing the trump card of US military superiority, an 
attempt that is, however, doomed to fail (see also Mann, 2004). As with Harvey, we find 
Arrighi’s analysis compelling in many respects, and indeed we will draw upon some of their 
ideas below. What we see as missing in these accounts though is the attention to the role of 
agency. Agency matters because there were, given the changing structural context, several 
options for US foreign policy after the turn of the millennium. The course that was chosen 
after 9/11 was far from a pre-determined one and was certainly not the only realistic response 
to the terrorist attacks themselves. It is thus that structuralist explanations cannot fully explain 
how and why one particular option was chosen over another.  
  
 Within a historical materialist tradition Paul (2007) offers an empirical analysis of 
‘neoconservative imperialism’ which does include the role of agency. He offers an innovative 
‘Gramscian’ interpretation of the US geopolitical strategy under Bush, arguing that it has to 
be interpreted as a ‘neoconservative moment’ of ‘American ceasarism’ which proved to be far 
from durable and in fact ‘by Fall 2005 had decisively ended’ (Ibid.: 66). Although we also 
adopt a neo-Gramscian conceptual framework, we would, in contrast to Paul, not see the 
‘neoconservative moment’ as merely a passing moment of ‘ceasarism’. Rather, we interpret it 
as indicating a longer lasting shift in geopolitical strategy, that moreover was supported not 
just by a ‘rather narrow “crony capital” class fraction’ (Ibid.: 65) -- as Paul claims without 
any empirical substantiation -- but, as our evidence will show, by a much broader array of 




Hegemonic Projects and the Integration of Structure and Agency 
 
The Gramscian term ‘hegemonic project’ as developed by Bob Jessop (1990) denotes the 
agential moment of structural change, in which agency transforms pre-existing structures, 
while at the same time being enabled and constrained by those structures. Following Gramsci, 
Jessop (1990: 208) refers to a successful hegemonic project as involving ‘the mobilization of 
support behind a concrete, national-popular program of action which asserts a general interest 
in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance the long-term interests of the 
hegemonic class (fraction)’. It is thus that a successful hegemonic project in the longer run 
will have to be linked to a successful accumulation strategy, that is, a strategy for the 
realization of  ‘a specific “growth model” complete with its various extra-economic 
preconditions’ (Ibid.: 198). The rise of a new hegemonic project, however, does not 
necessarily have to coincide with the rise of a new accumulation strategy (Ibid.: 346). As 
Jessop points out, it is important to see that while ‘they may overlap partially and / or 
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mutually condition each other’, accumulation strategy and hegemonic project are not 
identical:  
 
While accumulation strategies are directly concerned with economic expansion on a 
national or international scale, hegemonic projects can be concerned principally with 
various non-economic objectives (even if economically conditioned and economically 
relevant). The latter might include military success, social reform, political stability or 
moral regeneration (Ibid.: 208).  
 
In the short run, then, given ‘specific conjunctures’, there may well be a ‘dissociation or 
inconsistency between them’ (Ibid.). 
 We argue that in understanding the variations in US imperialism we also need to 
examine those ‘specific conjunctures’ in which one hegemonic project may take the place of 
another without necessarily being linked to a concomitant change in accumulation strategy. 
However, we stress with Jessop that in order to be successful hegemonic projects need to 
advance the interests of a dominant class fraction, and thus to be articulated to a successful 
accumulation strategy – whether old or new. Success is not guaranteed, but seeking to 
advance these interests is what a hegemonic project is about.  
 This brings us to the important ‘geopolitical’ dimension of any hegemonic project as 
formulated within the national context of a leading capitalist state such as the US. As states 
are key in providing the preconditions for capitalist markets to develop and for capitalist 
accumulation to take place (Van Apeldoorn and Horn, 2007), any national or transnational 
capitalist class is dependent upon the application of state power both nationally and 
internationally (e.g., Wood, 2003). Hegemonic projects, as expressive of underlying class 
interests, will therefore have to articulate not just a vision with regard to how to establish 
control over subordinate social groups in a domestic context (i.e. a national-popular 
programme), but also with respect to world order and the position of the respective state or 
states within it. It is thus that, as Van der Pijl (2007) maintains, class forms the crucial nexus 
between global capitalism and geopolitics: rather than viewing them as autonomous, they 
must be seen as internally related. This is not to imply that geopolitical strategy is in any way 
determined by objective class interests. On the contrary, these interests must be articulated 
politically and ideologically, and their possible translation into state policy must be seen as a 
contingent outcome of social and political struggles. Our claim is, however, that the content 
of these political and discursive practices is shaped by the social position of the actors 
engaging in it and by underlying social relations.4
Although the capitalist class of the most powerful state may be highly integrated into 
certain patterns of transnational class formation, it is plausible that it has, at the same time, a 
clear sense of a distinct national interest. Precisely because of the fact that it sits at the top of 
the international and global hierarchy, it is acutely aware of the interest it has in maintaining 
the current system and of what is has to lose if the system breaks down. We therefore 
hypothesize that hegemonic projects formulated within the context of such a dominant state 
 It is thus that we must analyse how actors 
formulating geopolitical strategies are, to use Gramsci’s (1971) terminology, organically 
linked to certain social forces and to class interests.  It are such ‘organic intellectuals’, located 
both within and beyond the state apparatus,  that must be seen as constructing a hegemonic 
project – formulating and disseminating a particular strategy – as an articulation of long-term 
class interests. It is thus that we seek to show how geopolitical strategy is not so much, as 
Harvey would have it, formulated by a class of state managers with separate interest and 
motivations (2003: 27), but by intellectuals, policy advisors and (in the end by)  state officials 
who are in fact closely linked to private capitalist interests. 
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will tend to express a strong geopolitical consciousness, and include a rather elaborate 
strategy with respect to how to exercise control over other states and their societies.  
It is from this perspective that we will below analyse the rise and fall of the 
neoconservative project in terms of a hegemonic project that has been formulated and 
propagated within the national political arena of the US and has subsequently been very 
successful in shaping US foreign policy after 9/11.5
 
 We explain the rise of this project by 
situating its origins within the contradictions and limits of what we see as the hegemonic 
project of neoliberal globalization that unfolded in the 1990s, while arguing that the effect of 
these structural dynamics were crucially mediated by the concrete agency of a political 
vanguard tied to dominant social forces within the US. The neoconservative project, we 
argue, offered an answer to that crucial question facing the US ruling class: how to prolong 
US global hegemony at a moment when the ‘answer’ of the neoliberal project no longer 
seemed that compelling anymore.  
 
 
Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal Globalization and the Neoconservative 
Response 
 
Neoliberalism is essentially a project of restoring capitalist class power by liberating capital 
from its postwar constraints through a programme of marketization and privatization. As an 
accumulation strategy neoliberalism has been bound up with the processes of globalization 
and above all financialization, that is, it has been linked to the interests and growth strategies 
of the most globalized transnational corporations, in particular those representing global 
financial capital (on the latter see Duménil and Lévy, 2001).  
In the US the rise of the neoliberal project is very much associated with the Reagan 
presidency, but it was under Clinton that the project both consolidated and deepened, indeed 
arguably reached its peak. Moreover, whereas, the Reagan era was still dominated by the 
geopolitics of the Cold War, it was the subsequent ‘defeat of the evil empire’ that opened up 
the possibility to ‘globalize’ the US liberal model that hitherto had been restricted to ‘the 
West’. It was thus that under Clinton neoliberalism was translated into a (neo)liberal 
internationalist foreign policy oriented towards the promotion of globalization as a 
programme of global marketization and commodification, with as its main instruments  
‘multilateralism’ and ‘global governance’ through such institutions as the IMF and the World 
Bank (Gowan,1999; Harvey, 2003, 2005; Van der Pijl, 2006: ch. 8).  
As a geopolitical strategy in the broader sense,  neoliberal globalization was about what 
has been dubbed ‘democratic enlargement’ (Brinkley, 1997) – effectively a strategy aimed 
capitalist market expansion in the long tradition of ‘Open Door imperialism’ (Williams, 2009; 
Layne, 2006) – the flip-side of which was a targeting of ‘rogue states’ who were resisting this 
liberal end-of-history world order (Dumbrell, 2002).  Although in the case of Serbia in 
particular this did lead to war – a critical geopolitical move on the part of the US (see, e.g., 
Cafruny, 2009) – covert actions and economic sanctions were still the preferred instrument of 
‘regime change’ (Harvey 2003: 195). Geopolitical rivalries were generally more muted in the 
post-Cold War 1990s and the globalization offensive (van der Pijl, 2006: ch. 8) generally 
emphasized consent over coercion.  
 However, as the 20th century came to a close the contradictions and limits of the 
neoliberal globalization project became increasingly manifest. In particular we identify the 
following sets of contradictions. First, within different national state-society complexes, and 
arguably above all in the US (see Harvey, 2003: 15-7), neoliberalism – as it promotes the 
commodification of everything, bringing more and more areas of social life under the 
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discipline of markets and of capital – tends to engender an atomization and social 
disintegration to such an extent as to undermine the social order that sustains capital 
accumulation. Increasingly this has engendered awareness, also on the part of various elites, 
that these centrifugal forces somehow have to be contained.  
 Second, and related to this fundamental social contradiction, since the end of the 1990s 
the political limits of neoliberalism have increasingly manifested themselves. What 
increasingly amounted to a transnational revolt against the discipline imposed by neoliberal 
globalization – or what Harvey (2003: 162-80) calls resistance against ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ – takes on many different shapes and identities: from Hugo Chavez’ Bolivarian 
revolution; to the alter-globalization movement, and arguably also to some forms of radical 
political Islam. The transnational hegemony of neoliberalism has been weakening as a result. 
Thus Van der Pijl (2006: 405) is probably right in arguing that ‘[t]he neoliberal programme of 
the West, run aground across the globe, but tenaciously pursued nevertheless, has conjured up 
its own nemesis, which instills fear into ruling classes’. We may add here that the US ruling 
class in particular has reason to be the most fearful, as it has the most to lose.  
 Third, neoliberal globalization produces new geo-economic and geopolitical tensions as 
the dynamics of global capital accumulation shift the centre of gravity of the global economy 
away from the Atlantic and towards the Pacific. This historic shift may be seen as the price of 
the success of the very project of neoliberal globalization and how it has spread capitalist 
growth beyond the capitalist heartland.  As described by both Arrighi (2005) and by Harvey 
(2003) the global process of endless capital accumulation, with US capital in the lead since 
the early 20th century, involves a process of constant geographical expansion as (surplus) 
capital needs to find new profitable outlets,  especially in order to overcome capitalism’s 
chronic tendency to produce crises of overaccumulation.  However, as Harvey explains, his 
‘spatial fix’ as a way to resolve capitalism’s inner contradictions, only reproduces these 
contradictions on a bigger geographical scale, as the export of capital creates ‘new spaces of 
capital accumulation [that] will ultimately generate surpluses and well seek ways to absorb 
them through geographical expansions’ (Harvey, 2003: 120).  Whereas the capitalist growth 
generated by US capitalist expansion in regions as Western Europe and Japan has not led to a 
successful challenge of US hegemony, arguably the more recent rise of East Asia, and 
especially China (Arrighi, 2005: 74-80; ) is of a different order, and has created rival centres 
of accumulation threatening the geopolitical and geo-economic preeminence of the US. 
The above outlined social, political and geopolitical contradictions and tensions 
became apparent before the manifestation of arguably the most fundamental contradiction of 
neoliberalism, which is that its finance-led accumulation strategy has produced enormous 
riches for a global rentier class that has effectively restored capitalist class hegemony under 
its leadership (Duménil and Levy, 2001), but is ultimately unable to sustain capitalist 
accumulation in the longer run. But, although with the burst of the dot com bubble and the 
subsequent recession,  the limits of financialization became visible already shortly after the 
turn of the millennium, it was still at that time most of all the political project of 
neoliberalism -- rather than its underlying accumulation strategy -- that had entered into a 
hegemonic crisis (cf. Paul, 2007). It is this hegemonic crisis, we argue, that enabled the rise of 
an alternative hegemonic project.  
One of the most important aspects of this neoconservative project in our view is its 
‘answer’ with respect to the first social contradiction of neoliberalism. Although 
neoconservatism has much in common with neoliberalism - in particular in its aim at 
preserving capitalist class power through strengthening the market as the arbiter of social life 
- it also goes beyond it in that it explicitly recognizes that the price mechanism alone cannot 
sufficiently provide order in society. It is the overriding concern with order, and the 
willingness to back up that order through coercion, both domestically and internationally, that 
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distinguishes the neoconservative project from the neoliberal project. As Harvey (2005: 82). 
writes: 
 
Neoconservatism [...] has reshaped neoliberal practices in two fundamental respects: 
first, in its concern for order as an answer to the chaos of individual interests, and 
second, in its concern for an overweening morality as the necessary social glue to keep 
the body politic secure in the face of internal and external dangers.  
 
The most crucial part of the neoconservative ‘answer’ to the political and geopolitical 
contradictions of the neoliberal project, we would argue, is about how to deal with the 
external dangers, imagined or real. We will here outline what can be regarded as the key 
elements of this neoconservative ‘answer’, i.e. geopolitical strategy (extensively described 
elsewhere, e.g., Kagan and Kristol, 2000 ; Dueck, 2004; Steltzer, 2004; Hurst, 2005)  
First, an emphasis on US global primacy as the explicit objective of US foreign policy: a 
clear and unequivocal commitment to maintain US’ global leadership and neutralize any 
potential threat to its supremacy. Second, a strong emphasis on US military (more than 
economic) supremacy as the foundation of its global power. Third, a rejection of what was at 
least a partial postwar commitment to multilateralism and a turn towards an explicit 
unilateralism in defence of US primacy. Fourth, what later came to be known as the pre-
emptive strike doctrine: the explicit claim of the US that it cannot be constrained by 
international law in preventing so-called threats to its national security.  Fifth, the dedication 
to ‘export’ liberal democracy if necessary through ‘regime change’ by military means. 
Although none of these elements were entirely new either in the theory or in the practice of 
US foreign policy, it was the particular emphasis they gained in the geopolitical strategy 
shaped by the neoconservatives during the 1990s that marked the crucial shift from the 
neoliberal globalization offensive of Clinton. Thus, for instance, although the objective of US 
primacy has arguably been at the heart of US ‘grand strategy’ since 1940 (Layne, 2006), it 
have been the neoconservatives that have made this again into the overt number one priority 
in the post- Cold War context, and, above all, have shifted the focus to military force as the 
main means to achieve it. These elements subsequently were brought together under, and 
legitimated by, the concept of the war on terror, which enabled a redefinition of the security 
environment and the ‘enemy’; a reform of the US military and intelligence services, and set 
the context for new forms of international and military cooperation such as ad hoc ‘coalitions 
of the willing’ (see for this last point also Krahmann, 2005). Above all it was under the 
banner of the war on terror that a coercive geopolitical strategy aimed at, as we shall argue 
below, the global promotion of US-centred neoliberal accumulation could be  presented as in 
the general interest of ‘ultimately fighting for our democratic values and way of life’ (White 
House, 2002:31). 
As has been extensively documented elsewhere (e.g. Dorrien , 2004, ch. 4; Halper and 
Clarke, 2004), it was this comprehensive geopolitical strategy that came to be adopted by the 
Bush administration after 9/11, as most clearly expressed in the key policy document of the 
2002 National Security Strategy (White House, 2002). The blueprint for this strategy was, 
however, already devised in the early 90s, but at the time was still far too controversial and 
therefore quickly shelved (Tyler, 1992). It was the ‘window of opportunity’ provided by 9/11 
that allowed for the implementation of this strategy a decade later, as in that context it 
appeared to be a plausible strategy to deal with the US new ‘external dangers’. These 
structural and circumstantial conditions have not determined this outcome however; other 
kinds of answers were possible.  We argue that the reason why it was this particular answer -- 
that had been more than ten years in the making -- that ultimately came to be translated into 





The Rise of the Neoconservative Project -- a Social Network Analysis 
 
In this section we will analyse the agency that constructed and propagated the 
neoconservative project by employing Social Network Analysis (SNA), using the software 
programme UCINET (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002). SNA distinguishes itself from 
more traditional methods in that it focuses on relations between actors instead of comparing 
their attributes (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Hence it allows for an analysis of how 
individual agency is embedded in and at the same time constructs social structure. Such a 
methodological approach marries well with our theoretical approach: it will allow us to 
analyse how strategic actors shaping US geopolitical strategy occupy certain social positions, 
linked to an underlying class structure that forms an important context in which their practices 
are shaped.  
 
 
Mapping the Neoconservative Network 
 
In order to identify the neoconservative network, we took as our point of the departure the 
well known platform from which the neoconservative project was launched: The Project for 
the New American Century (PNAC). Although maybe not the most extensive or durable 
channel of neoconservative thought, the PNAC, founded in 1997 by William Kristol, did 
come to serve as a focal point of the neoconservative project, in which previously existing 
ideas, actors and influences converged.  We took as our selection criterion the most active 
affiliates of PNAC6
Confirming the centrality of the PNAC as a focal point of the neoconservative network, 
it turned out that PNAC affiliation generated a vast, dense, and highly cohesive network. 
Graph 1 below gives an overview of the PNAC network’s affiliations to 1) the private 
institutional level (e.g. neoconservative think tanks, policy institutes, media), 2) government 
(the Republican administrations of Reagan 1981-1989, Bush 1989-1993, Bush Jr 2001-2006), 
3) ad-hoc geopolitical strategy projects; and, 4) corporate affiliations (board membership, 
executive and advisory functions). The graph shows that there are no isolates (i.e. 
unconnected actors), and that only a very few actors have but one connection.
 in the period 1997-2001 (N=52) and from them the network was mapped 
out by listing the affiliations of each of these actors in the period from the end of the Cold 
War until 2006.  
7  In fact, a 
substantial part of the network, 27 out of our 52 actors, is connected on all four dimensions. 
These findings thus confirm the notion that there has been a cohesive neoconservative 
network with a vast institutional structure at its disposal, providing it with a dense and highly 
connected pattern of channels through which ideas could be diffused and shared.8




Sources: Who’s Who 2006, International Relations Center 2006, Right Web, http://rightweb.irc-online.org/about.php (10.09.06), biographies, membership rosters, participant 
lists, annual reports of the affiliated companies, institutions and organisations. 
 
 
 To assess the overlap between the identified neoconservative network and the state level, 
the actors’ affiliations with US (Republican) administrations, since the Reagan administration, 
were mapped. Table 1 below provides an overview of the total of interlocks.  The total 
number of interlocks with Republican administrations ranges from a total of 34 in the Reagan 
administration, 23 in the Bush Sr. administration, and 29 in the Bush Jr. administration. 
Although these numbers suggest that the presence of the neoconservatives was strongest in 
the Reagan administration, it must be taken into account that in the last Republican 
administration these actors generally held more powerful positions than in the two preceding 
ones -- showing their prolonged rise to power. More importantly, whereas the presence of 
neoconservatives in Republican administrations has been relatively constant, it has been the 
interplay with crucial structural changes that produced the particular shift in US geopolitical 
strategy that we are analysing. 
 
Table 1 State Affiliations 
                                                  
  1 2 3 
  Bush Jr Bush Sr. Reagan 
1 Bush Jr.   (2001-2008) 29 17 21 
2 Bush Sr.   (1989-1993) 17 23 19 
3 Reagan    (1981-1989) 21 19 34 
 
Sources: Who’s Who 2006, International Relations Center 2006, biographies, membership rosters, participant 
overviews, annual reports of the affiliations.  
  
 
Although the reach of the neoconservative network into the Bush government was thus 
extensive, we need to establish how the ideas that were formed and disseminated at the 
private institutional level did actually reach into government and were turned into official US 
foreign policy. Therefore we need to go back to the 1990s when various ad-hoc ‘projects’ 
were initiated in which this geopolitical strategy was formulated and presented as the answer 
to perceived ‘present dangers’ (Kagan and Kristoll, 2000). These ad-hoc projects generated 
reports and advocacy statements, with the explicit aim to influence US foreign policy. In 
order to show a direct relation between these formulations of geopolitical strategy and official 
US post-9/11 geopolitical strategy, we should find not only an overlap in content, but also a 
plausible connection to the level of official foreign policymaking. We thus identified those 
actors from the neoconservative network that participated in a selection of the most 
significant of these ad-hoc study projects and analysed their interlocks with the Bush Jr. 
administration. The most important ‘projects’ are the 1992 Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) 
which provided a quite literal blueprint for what later became the ‘war on terror’; the PNAC 
(2000) report: Rebuilding America’s Defences, which states in its introduction to build further 
upon the shelved DPG 1992 and is intended as ‘a roadmap for the nation’s immediate and 
future defense plans’; the Center for Peace and Security in the Gulf, which in 1998 advocated 
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein; and the PNAC volume Present Dangers: Crisis and 
Opportunity in American Defense and Foreign Policy (Kagan and Kristoll, 2000) a key 
representative volume of neoconservative foreign policy thought. Other included projects are: 
the Rumsfeld 1998 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S.; the National 
Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) team’s ‘Study on Rationale and Requirements for Nuclear 
Forces and Arms Control’ (from 2001); and the RAND Transition 2001 Panel.  
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Graph 2, below, contains what is labelled a ‘Geopolitical Strategy Route’: a mapping of 
the involved actors in the above outlined ‘projects’ and their interlocks with the Bush Jr. 
administration and other key institutional nodes: the Defense Policy Board  -- which played a 
critical role in the formulation of post-9/11 foreign policy (see e.g. Halper and Clarke, 2004; 
Dorrien, 2004) -- and the influential Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. 
This rather complicated web of interlocking relations clearly reveals not only the degree 
of direct interaction that has been taking place between a substantive number of actors within 
small subsets of the network, but also how through these interactions at the private 
institutional level, ideas and concrete policy proposals were directly inserted into actual 
foreign policy-making. Thus, for instance, we can read from this graph that: of all those 
involved in at least one of these study projects, 22 held a position in the Bush administration, 
many of them on crucial Defence, National Security and Intelligence positions. And of the 
 





Key: actor = circle, public sector = triangle, private sector = square,  
node size = degree (i.e. ratio total number of affiliations of actor or a sector to total number of affiliations). 
 
Sources: as above.  
 
 
principal actors involved in the 1992 Defense Policy Guidance Draft, all three (Cheney, 
Wolfowitz and Libby) have had high level positions in the Bush administrations. What the 
above analysis thus shows is how this influence has been facilitated through long-term and 
recurrent active promotion of certain ideas through an extensive network of institutional and 






A Neoconservative Hegemonic Project? 
 
Although the neoconservatives through the above mapped network have thus been successful 
in propagating and turning into official policy their particular strategy to prolong US global 
primacy, the question remains to what extent the neoconservative project actually constituted 
a hegemonic project. To what extent was it a national-popular programme that rested upon the 
consent of broad sections of society? And to what extent was the neoconservative project 
actually linked to and seeking to advance the long-term interests of dominant class fractions?  
With regard to the first question it must be remembered that the neoconservative project 
constituted a much more comprehensive political programme than just a geopolitical strategy, 
addressing not only the question of how to preserve and even expand US power abroad, but 
also how to restore social order at home. Although it falls largely outside the scope of this 
article, this domestic dimension has of course been important in creating consent and a social 
base for the Bush administrations national popular programme. A programme that in many 
respects continued the neoliberalism of his predecessors, in fact, even deepening this in terms 
of redistribution of wealth towards the top but added to it the dimensions of social 
conservatism (‘morality’) and increasing state surveillance (especially after 9/11) (see Stelzer, 
2004). An important element here was the growing Christian fundamentalism within a large 
section of US society; a source of popular support upon which the neoconservatives skilfully 
drew (Harvey, 2003: 190-9). The most important indicator of popular support for this 
programme has of course been the re-election of Bush in 2004. As is well known, this popular 
support applied not only to domestic but also to the new foreign policy, with the ‘war on 
terror’ indeed having developed into a hegemonic discourse shared by both Republicans and 
Democrats  
 Given our premise that a hegemonic project is about the pursuit of objectives that serve 
the long-term interests of a hegemonic class (fraction) (Jessop, 1990:208), we now turn to 
second question: to what extent can we link this programme to dominant capitalist class 
interests? We will do this by analysing the neoconservative network’s corporate affiliations 
and the support for the neoconservative strategy in terms of campaign finance and policy 
advocacy. 
 A mapping of the corporate affiliations of the members of the neoconservative network 
revealed that 60 per cent has had direct corporate affiliations.9 The total of interlocks amounts 
to 94 and included almost 80 different corporations. Graph 3 below clusters the affiliated 
corporations by sector.10
 
 The size of the nodes expresses the actor’s ‘degree’, i.e. their 
number of ties with the corporate world compared to the total of corporate interlocks, the 
thickness of the tie expresses the strength of each actor’s connection to a particular sector, 
which can be several. The exact overall distribution of corporate interlocks is: defence 28; 











Key: sectors=squares, actors =circles, size of nodes = node degree (i.e. ratio total number of 
affiliations of actor / sector to total number of affiliations), tie strength = number of affiliations of 
actor to sector. 
 
Sources: see text.  
 
The extensive link with the defence industry does appear to confirm the often suggested 
tight link between the neoconservatives and the defence sector (Hossein-zadeh, 2006; Paul, 
2007). Our findings, however, make clear that there is also a large overlap with financial 
capital groups, technology firms and law firms. A substantial part of the affiliated 
corporations (almost 20 per cent) moreover had a Fortune 500 notation,11 which indicates 
both the size and the multinational scope of a substantial part of the affiliated corporations. 
On the basis of these data we therefore do not find it plausible to conclude that narrow 
interests in the defence industry solely or even primarily shaped the strategy of the Bush 
administration. Of course, the defence industry has specific interests and will also try to 
advance those. The Center for Public Integrity has for instance estimated the total amount of 
post-war contracts to US corporations (about 150) in Iraq and Afghanistan to be around $ 48.7 
billion.12 And of those corporations several are directly affiliated to the neoconservative 
network we have identified (e.g. Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Science Applications 
International Corp., Dyncorp International, Halliburton, and Kellogg, Brown and Root). But 
contrary to what is often claimed, we did not find empirical evidence of the manifestation of a 
clash of interests between these more narrow capital groups and other sectors, such as 
financial capital. This indicates that the strategy as formulated and implemented by the Bush 
administration rested upon the support of a much wider set of capitalist class interests than 
has been suggested in some of the literature. 
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This broad support amongst the dominant fractions of US capital also transpires from 
an analysis of the campaign support in 2004. The Bush administration received its largest 
contributions from the sector of high finance, a capital fraction that might be considered 
representing transnationally mobile and global capital par excellence. Wall Street icons such 
as Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, PricewaterhouseCoopers were major 
contributors to Bush’s 2004 campaign and the financial sector at large supported him with 
double the amount that was offered to his strongest democratic contender (Center for 
Responsive Politics, 2006). If we interpret this financial support in 2004 as a verdict on 
Bush’s post-9/11 (geo-)political programme, it indicates that the support from the corporate 
and financial world -- including the most powerful of Wall Street’s firms - has been quite 
high.  
Not only have leading capitalist interests supported Bush’s (re-)election, they have also 
at times expressed key vocal support for Bush’s post 9/11 policies. The US Chamber of 
Commerce, the world largest business federation and one of the nation’s most prominent 
business lobbies, for instance, stated in its 2002 annual report that it ‘fully support[s] 
President Bush’s war against terrorism on all fronts’, adding in what can be seen as an 
unequivocal endorsement of what later came to be known as the Bush doctrine that  ‘the 
centrepiece of homeland defense must be to bring the war to the enemy’ (US Chamber of 
Commerce, 2002: 24). This support for what they anticipated to be a ‘lengthy war’ included 
the willingness to ‘pay for a costly but essential defense of our homeland and our way of life’ 
(Ibid.: 9); US business will thus also ‘[c]ontinue to support necessary increases in defense 
appropriations’ (US Chamber of Commerce, 2003: 16).  
 We thus conclude that the neoconservative project has from the start been linked to and 
supported by leading fractions of US capital, including the defence industry but also Wall 
Street and other sections of transnational capital. More importantly, the support extended to 
the geopolitical strategy, which was perceived to be also a defence of US capital’s global 
interests. Moreover, this geopolitical strategy, far from seen as potentially undermining the 
conditions for accumulation, was perceived to be congruent with the still hegemonic 
neoliberal accumulation strategy. Thus the Chamber saw ‘the successful prosecution of the 
war on terrorism’ as a key to economic recovery (2002: 13-4). 
 For the Bush administration these elements were also seen as integral parts of the same 
strategy, and as such it remained committed to a neoliberal accumulation strategy based upon 
the logic of global free markets and free trade. In fact, an essential element of the post 9/11 
geopolitical strategy, as outlined in the National Security Strategy of 2002 (White House, 
2002), was to facilitate and legitimize the global expansion of capital to previously closed 
areas (as was the intention with Iraq and Afghanistan), formulating as one of its main 
objectives to ‘ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade’ 
(Ibid.: 17).13
 
 Although indeed certain narrow defence industry interests benefitted directly 
from the strategy in terms of a radically increased defence budget and reconstruction contracts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the support for the neoconservative strategy of the other capital 
groups identified above, we would argue, stems from the fact that it was aimed at advancing 
the interests of US capital at large along the lines of the hegemonic neoliberal accumulation 
strategy, i.e., it was perceived as the best strategy to defend the interests of the US ruling 
class. Another matter is whether these interests were also served in the longer run, or whether 
inherent limitations of this strategy, have not meant that ultimately the conditions for 





The Limits of the Neoconservative Project 
 
In the longer run, we would suggest, the neoconservative project has not been successful as a 
hegemonic project. Although this was most obvious with respect to the fallout of the Iraq 
quagmire, the particular geopolitical strategy that was implemented after 9/11 also created a 
more general backlash inasmuch as the emphasis on coercion led to a loss of consent 
internationally. Although the ‘war on terror’ was supported by a broad international coalition, 
the aggressive unilateralism displayed by the Bush administration and its explicit disregard of 
international law and human rights has generated global discontent, provoked more assertive 
policies from major and minor contenders, and generally further eroded the already waning 
legitimacy of US hegemony. Moreover, the geopolitical strategy was an extremely costly one 
which, while initially boosting particular sectors in the US economy, in the longer term only 
weakened the already fragile economic position of the US (e.g. Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008).  
Secondly, and even more importantly, the neoconservative project entirely ignored the 
formulation of a new accumulation strategy in meeting the challenges of the faltering 
neoliberal project. As argued above, a hegemonic project, in order to be successful in the long 
run, does need to be articulated with a successful accumulation strategy. However, the 
neoconservative project, while providing a set of answers to the new geopolitical situation, 
failed to address the limits of the neoliberal accumulation strategy that have become 
increasingly apparent. Indeed, the global financial and economic crisis that erupted towards 
the end of the Bush presidency has demonstrated the bankruptcy of this strategy, also from the 
perspective of the general capitalist interest. The crisis has also further weakened US power 
and discredited its global policies, leading to a collapse of the Washington Consensus. It is 
this that forms the structural global context in which Obama and his administration will have 
to act to formulate a new and more effective strategy or hegemonic project. 
 
 
Continuity and Change after the Neoconservative Project 
 
It has been in the context of the failing neoconservative project that the need for change was 
widely and deeply felt within the US and across the globe, a sentiment that was aptly captured 
by the slogan with which Obama won the presidency. In this final section we will assess to 
what extent change is actually possible and how it relates to continuities in US imperialism. 
We will therefore turn to the agency involved in the networks of influence and power behind 
the Obama administration. Although it is too early to identify whether the Obama 
administration really pursues its own distinct geopolitical strategy, let alone whether we can 
speak of the rise of a new hegemonic project, our purpose is rather to assess -- again with the 
help of social network analysis -- both the agential and structural elements that may or may 




Networks of Change? 
 
 
In order to get a better grasp of the agency behind Obama we took the inner circle of his 
administration, including the White House Staff and the Cabinet members (appointed at time 
of writing) and some highly influential economic and foreign policy advisors behind the 
scenes (N=46). Data were collected from governmental websites, and cross checked with 
biographies published on institutional and corporate websites, Business Week and Forbes 
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people tracker. Similar to the procedure with regard to the neoconservative network, these 
actors’ affiliations were mapped at different levels: the state-level, the private institutional 
level, and the corporate level. In order to place the Obama-network in a broader historical 
perspective the interlocks with previous administrations back to 1981 were mapped. The 








































7 16 1 1 6 0 10 
Reagan 
1981-1989 
1 1 2 1 0 1 0 
Bush sr. 
1989-1993 
0 1 1 3 2 3 2 
Clinton 
1993-2001 
7 6 0 2 20 3 13 
W. Bush 
2001-2008  
0 1 1 3 3 5 3 
Other State 
Affiliation 
13 10 0 2 13 2 34 
 
Source:  US Government, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/ 
 
 
From the diagonal we can read the total of affiliations with each administration. The overlap 
between the key actors in the Obama administration with the Clinton administration (20 out of 
46) clearly stands out. Remarkably, there is however also an overlap between the Obama and 
the Bush administrations of about 11 per cent. The category ‘Other State Affiliation’ refers to 
either positions before 1981, or to functions that are at state level, but not the White House 
Staff or the Cabinet. The fact that this category has such a high level of interlocks may be 
taken as a sign of continuity inasmuch as many of the Obama inner circle have a long history 
of US policy-making and hence are deeply socialized with the ‘rules of the game’.  
 Turning to the level of ideas, Graph 4 below depicts think tank affiliation and academic 
affiliation of the Obama network. The reach of this network is in fact much wider, but we 
only included affiliations with at least two interlocks. The actor degree is expressed in size, 
which means a bigger node implies more affiliations. The graph shows some distinct clusters 
within the network.   
 7 





Sources:  US Government, White House, institutional websites, corporate websites, 
Business Week, Forbes. 
 
 
The bottom-left corner shows a cluster with a transnational, neoliberal focus, including 
affiliations with the Trilateral Commission, the Aspen Institute and the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics. Susan Rice, Paul Volcker, Laura D’Andrea, Timothy Geithner and 
Michael Froman are key nodes in this cluster. A similar transnational orientation speaks from 
the affiliations with the Atlantic Council of the US, a think tank that however focuses more on 
US leadership and foreign policy. In the left upper corner we find a cluster that is much more 
oriented toward security issues and the idea of ‘American primacy’, showing a high interlock 
with the Center for a New American Security, a centrist think tank established in 2007 with 
close ties to defence industry (Lockheed Martin and Raytheon). John Podesta and Denis C. 
Blair are key figures here. Another national security cluster can be found at the opposite side 
of the graph, just below the upper right hand corner, with Hillary Clinton, Tom Vilsack and 
Austan Goolsbee as key players connected to the Democratic Leadership Council and the 
Progressive Policy Institute. These think tanks, which in reality are closely linked, are known 
for their hawkish view on national security issues (e.g. Heilbrun, 2006), not deviating much 
from the neoconservative views on those matters. The strongest academic link was found with 
Harvard University (Obama’s alma mater) and the University of Chicago.15
In short, the Obama team at the level of ideas appears to consist of several clusters 
focussing on either national security issues, of which some can be characterized as 
considerably hawkish, or on economic issues, where the affiliated institutions bear a clearly 
neoliberal mark and history. But to what extent and how is the Obama network linked to 





Graph 5 Corporate Affiliations Obama Team  
 
 
Key: sectors=squares, actors =circles, size of nodes = node degree (i.e. ratio total number 
of affiliations of actor / sector to total number of affiliations), tie strength = number of 
affiliations of actor to sector. 
 
Sources:  US Government, White House, institutional websites, corporate websites, 
Business Week, Forbes. 
 
 
It turns out that 26 out of the 46 actors within the Obama network had corporate ties.16
In comparison to the neoconservative network the overall overlap with the corporate 
world is nearly as extensive: 60 per cent in the case of the neoconservatives compared to more 
than 55 per cent in the case of the Obama network. One notable difference in the overall 
 
Although space constraints do now allow us to present the full list of companies involved, 
these include (former) Wall Street giants such as: Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Lehman 
Brothers, Citigroup, AIG; multinationals such as: WalMart, Nestlé, Microsoft, AT & T, 
Kodak; energy and defence majors such as Chevron, Boeing, Honeywell International, and 
international law firms such as Mc Kinsey; Albright Group, and Kissinger Associates. In the 
graph these affiliations are aggregated per sector. The size of the node expresses the degree, 
that is: the total number of corporate affiliations of the Obama-network within this particular 
sector. The exact numbers are: Consultancy / Lawyers: 23; Finance: 15, Miscellaneous: 12, 
Technology: 10, Defence: 5, Media: 3, Energy: 2. There are also interlocks with the following 
global regulatory bodies: the IMF (1), the BIS (1), the World bank (1), the Group of 30 (2) 
and NYSE (1). The biggest overlap is clearly with the law firms, followed by the financial 
sector, and technology -- sectors that are arguably highly transnational and neoliberal in 
outlook. As we have seen (see Graph 3, p. xx), these sectors were also heavily interlinked 
with the Bush administration.  
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distribution of the interlocks is the relations to the defence sector. Whereas there are ties 
between the Obama administration and the defence industry (recent directorships in boards of 
e.g. Ducommun, EDO Defense Systems, Honeywell and Boeing Co.), the total number of 
interlocks is modest in contrast to the neoconservative network where the defence industry 
was in fact was the most extensively affiliated sector.17
 In sum, the network analysis of the Obama presidency shows elements of both 
continuity and change with respect to previous administrations. The continuity is the most 
obvious with respect to the Clinton administration. Yet equally striking is the continuity in 
terms of the extent and sectoral composition of corporate affiliations with respect to the 
neoconservative network of the Bush administration -- notwithstanding the relative shift away 
from the defence industry. The continuing dominance of financial sector ties -- which is 
probably an aspect of continuity stretching back to at least Clinton -- can be seen as an 
indication of the hegemonic position of this capital fraction (until recently at least) and of a 
concomitant neoliberal accumulation strategy. 
 
18
The next question is how this configuration of actors, ideas and interests shapes the 
geopolitical strategy of the new administration and to what extent and how it could offer an 
‘answer’ to the inherited structural conditions. An important point to emphasize is that, 
following our theoretical approach, the strategy cannot be simply read of the network of 
actors, their positions, ideas and interests; because their agency is also critically shaped by the 
broader global context in which they find themselves -- a context which at the same time is 
also a product of past strategies, including that of the neoconservative project. It is for this 
reason for instance that despite the high number of former Clinton officials within the Obama 
team, we cannot expect a simple return to Clintonesque neoliberal imperialism. Whereas we 
cannot yet identify, let alone assess, an ‘Obama doctrine’, we highlight some aspects of his 





Strategies of Change?  
 
With regard to Obama’s foreign and security policies, one main difference with Bush so far 
appears to be the shift from Iraq to Afghanistan (and Pakistan), the real ‘central front in the 
war on terror’ (Obama, 2008: 114), with the recently announced ‘surge’ of another 30,000 
troops (the second increase under Obama) to ‘disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda’ (White 
House, 2009) trebling the number of troops present under Bush. This geographical shift in the 
former ‘long war’ does not represent much substantive change though, as this shift would also 
have taken place under Bush, and in fact was already announced by his – now Obama’s - 
defence secretary (Robert Gates) towards the end of his administration . 
Beyond concrete policies, and in terms of a more overarching geopolitical strategy, the 
new administration reveals a substantial continuity in terms of the geopolitical strategy as 
devised by the neoconservatives, even if the emphasis and tone has changed significantly.  
Obama remains committed to some kind of ‘project for a new American century’, continuing 
to ‘believe’, that the US is there to lead the world in the name of liberty and, importantly, that 
this leadership role implies increasing US’s coercive capacity to be projected around the 
globe, in spite of a recognition that the rise of new powers may constrain this ability and 
might make a US-dominated system of global governance more difficult to sustain (see e.g. 
Obama, 2009a). This continuity was already apparent during the campaign (for a 
comprehensive overview of actual policy plans and proposals see Obama, 2008: 109-48). 
Below the rhetoric of change, this campaign revealed a commitment to a militaristic ‘liberal 
interventionist’ foreign policy that, in spite of a difference in emphasis with regard to some 
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elements, represented far from a radical break with Bush’s ‘neoconservative’ policies. Indeed, 
a key element of Obama’s ‘plan’ to ‘rebuild America’s leadership’ has from the outset been, 
as with his predecessor, to maintain US military superiority in all areas to take on new 
‘twenty-first-century security challenges’ such as terrorism, ‘rogue nations’, ‘and rising 
powers that could become adversaries’ (Obama, 2008: 122-3). Restoring US leadership here 
then not only means launching a public diplomacy offensive to ‘show the Muslim world the 
best America has to offer’ (Ibid. 118-19, witness the Cairo speech), but also, for instance, 
preserving ‘[the US’s] unparalleled airpower capabilities to deter and defeat any conventional 
competitors’ (Ibid.: 125). Both the continuing aspiration at American global leadership as 
well as the militaristic orientation of the strategy towards that aim clearly transpire from the 
following key foreign policy speech that Obama held in 2007: 
 
I reject the notion that the American moment has passed.  I dismiss the cynics who say 
that this new century cannot be another when, in the words of President Franklin 
Roosevelt, we lead the world in battling immediate evils and promoting the ultimate 
good.  (…) We must maintain the strongest, best-equipped military in the world in 
order to defeat and deter conventional threats.  But while sustaining our technological 
edge will always be central to our national security, the ability to put boots on the 
ground will be critical in eliminating the shadowy terrorist networks we now face.  
(….) A 21st century military to stay on the offense, from Djibouti to Kandahar 
(Obama, 2007). 
 
It is true that Obama of course also at the same time, and in contrast to his predecessor, 
emphasizes the role of importance of international institutions and regimes (lauding in 
particular the UN) and since taking office has stepped up, next to the deliberate public 
relations efforts to restore America’s image abroad, the kind of diplomatic engagement -- 
including with so-called rogue states -- that was already going on in a more muted way at the 
end of the Bush reign.  Although this engagement in the meantime has turned out to be less 
effective than hoped for and is being criticised from both the left and the right, and for 
instance vis-à-vis Iran a more hard-line stance seems now again in the offing, not just in style 
and tone but also in terms of actual foreign policy-making during Obama’s first year ‘the 
multilateral gloves’ (Stokes, 2005) have to some extent been put back on. This seems to fit 
well with a ‘liberal internationalist’ outlook such as was also expressed by previous 
democratic administrations (e.g. Chanley, 1999). Yet this should not be taken as simply a 
return to previous policies.  
First, the renewed emphasis on institutions and diplomacy is combined with a continued 
emphasis on the need to enhance and apply military power, and more so than during the last 
Democratic presidency. A clear testimony of this is Obama’s Noble Peace Prize acceptance 
speech in which he stated that ‘it was not just simply international institutions (….) that 
brought stability to a post-World War II world. (…) The United States of America has helped 
to underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the 
strengths of our arms’ (Obama, 2009b). In the same speech, praised by the leading 
neoconservative Robert Kagan (2009) as signalling a ‘significant shift’ towards ‘a tougher, 
less forgiving, more quintessentially American approach’, Obama moreover reiterated that ‘I -
- like any head of state -- reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend my nation’ 
(Obama, 2009b).   
Second, inasmuch as Obama does represent a relative shift back from coercion to 
consent, this should be seen in light of the failures of the coercive strategies of 
neoconservative imperialism. As the latter has undermined consent for US power so much as 
to become rather counter-productive, playing the ‘goodwill’ card may not only come naturally 
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to Obama, but could also be seen as a strategy to seek to restore what is left of US global 
hegemony. The renewed search for consent that we have observed in  Obama’s first year, 
however, is one that is borne out of the fact that the US has only few cards left. This is 
crucially different from the neoliberal project of the Clinton years, which were the heyday for 
the power of both the US and the neoliberal ideology. In short, inasmuch as multilateralism is 
making somewhat of a comeback, it is out of weakness rather than strength.  
Finally, as indicated, the biggest challenge for Obama arguably lies on the economic 
front, where Obama not only has to adapt to the new multipolar reality and the loss of US 
structural power, but also will have to cope with the economic and ideological failure of the 
neoliberal accumulation strategy as has been pursued over the past decades; a failure which 
can be seen as at the heart of the current economic crisis. Returning to our network analysis 
above, the fact that largely the same people, linked to the same capital interests, which 
promoted the neoliberal accumulation strategy in the 1990s in the first place (e.g. Larry 
Summers, Paul Volcker) are now in charge of solving the crisis, in this respect may not bode 
well. Although Obama has recognized, and indeed made into a key priority of his overall 
foreign policy, the need to tackle the financial crisis also at a global level, in particular 
through the G-20 as the new primary platform for global economic governance, the three 
summits held thus far have produced little in the way of concrete steps towards a global re-





Whereas the US has been embarked on an imperialist project since at least the beginning of 
the 20th century, the particular kind of strategy that has been pursued to obtain this goal has 
varied according to the dialectical interaction between structural conditions and the role of 
agency and ideas, both globally, transnationally and domestically. This study has analysed 
both the neoconservative geopolitical strategy and the emerging geopolitical strategy of the 
Obama administration from a perspective that focuses on this dialectical interplay by 
interpreting these strategies as (potential) hegemonic projects and placing them in the context 
of the deepening contradictions of neoliberalism and a changing global economic and political 
order.    
While the geopolitical strategy of the US during the Cold War was aimed at 
consolidating and preserving US hegemony within the capitalist world economy in the face of 
the challenge posed by the Soviet Union, and thus at ‘protecting the West’ – and its propertied 
classes – while at the same time maintain US primacy within it,  the end of this conflict 
offered a chance for the US to extend its power and hegemony across the whole globe; to 
seize and consolidate ‘the unipolar moment’ and reshape the world order accordingly. In our 
view the main variations of US imperialism we have observed in the post-Cold War period 
are basically variations on this theme, that is, they are different strategies to achieve this same 
objective. The first such attempt crystallized under Clinton in a neoliberal project, the second 
such attempt was articulated under Bush as the neoconservative project cum geopolitical 
strategy. Although with Obama it has dawned upon the US that the unipolar moment may 
indeed have already passed or at least be nearing its end, we would contend that the 
fundamental objective of his administration’s geopolitical strategy remains to preserve and 
where possible to expand US global power. Although more research needs to be undertaken 
here as the Obama strategy evolves, our preliminary analysis suggests that here too US state 
power must be seen in relation to class power.  Rather than serving an autonomous raison 
d’état US state power serves the social purpose of supporting and sustaining the global 
expansion of US capital (Wood, 2003; Williams, 2009; cf. Layne, 2006). How and by which 
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strategy this social purpose will be served by the Obama administration, and how successful 
this strategy will be, should become clearer in the course of the next years. As argued, here 
we should relate the structural context of the global and US political economy to the position 
and outlook of the network of actors formulating and implementing US geopolitical strategy.  
In spite of the strong continuity in terms of actors of the Obama administration with 
the Clinton administration, we conclude that this should not lead us to expect a simple return 
to the neoliberal strategies of the 90s. On the one hand, the election of Obama confirmed what 
was already apparent towards the end of the Bush reign: namely that the neoconservative 
project -- in which the US seeks to secure its long-term imperialist objectives primarily by 
playing the military trump card and seeking to impose US-style liberal democracy and 
markets through preventive war -- as such is over and as a hegemonic project only had short-
lived success. Deepening the contradictions it set out to resolve, the neoconservative project 
actually undermined the prospects of success with respect to its most important objective: to 
prolong US hegemony into the next century.    
On the other hand, a return to Clintonesque neoliberalism will not be possible, neither 
in economic policy nor in foreign policy, as indeed the policy record of Obama thus far 
confirms. Although his presidency ended with the aerial campaign against Serbia, the 
preferred instrument of US imperialism under Clinton was ‘the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF 
complex’ (Harvey, 2003: 185) seeking to globalise the ‘empire of capital’ (Wood, 2003) 
through largely non-military means (even if crucially backed up by US military might). Such 
a programme is no longer feasible for Obama. First of all, unlike Clinton, Obama’s 
presidency is very much a war presidency and likely to remain so into a second term should 
he win the next elections. Although Obama has promised to end the war in Iraq at the time of 
writing the ‘responsible withdrawal’ of troops from the country has yet to begin while the 
administration has pledged to keep up to 50,000 troops beyond the August 2010 deadline. In 
contrast to the Iraq war, Obama has embraced Afghanistan as his own – calling it a ‘war of 
necessity’, and is stepping up the war effort to such an extent that in spite of talk about an 
‘exit strategy’ it seems nearly impossible for the US to extricate itself from this region in the 
near future. These continuing wars on the frontiers of the (arguably overextended) ‘US 
empire’ are both an indication of the limits of the earlier neoliberal globalization strategy as 
of its continuing geopolitical interests in these regions.  In a context in which US structural 
power within the global political economy has only been further eroded -- with the neoliberal 
‘growth model’ itself in crisis -- and in which China increasingly seems to present itself as an 
effective contender of US hegemony, it seems likely that the defence of such geopolitical 
interests will continue to rely on the use of force.   
These are then the structural conditions that the geopolitical strategists of the Obama 
administration face. These conditions will not determine the strategy but define the limits of 
the possible. Analysing the dialectical interplay of structure and agency over time we see how 
the past strategies of the neoconservatives have helped to shape the present structural context 
which will require a different response and strategy to restore or prolong US primacy. As we 
have argued, a critical element of such a response, and a necessary one for it to constitute a 
viable new hegemonic project within the US state-society complex, would be a new 
accumulation strategy or successful growth model as the basis for a new successful 
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1 The past eight years, sparked by the policies of Bush, have witnessed a widespread debate on the concept of 
American empire (see, just to mention a few: Cox, 2004; Mann, 2004; Ferguson, 2008). In this article we are 
agnostic regarding the question whether or not the US constitutes and empire. But with Saull (2008: 311) we 
argue that: ‘[t]he denial of empire (…) does not mean the United States is not imperial or imperialist’.  
2 In his sketchy account of the causes of the rise of this new variety of US imperialism Harvey suggests two 
explanations. One refers to the abovementioned limits of neoliberalism itself, not just the limits of the neoliberal 
‘growth model’ with the bursting of the dot com bubble but also with respect to a disintegration of US civil 
society and how ‘[t]he evil enemy without became the prime force through which to exorcise or tame the devils 
lurking within’ (Harvey, 2003: 17). The other, focusing in particular on the Iraq war, refers to his argument that 
it is ‘all about oil’ and the control of the ‘global oil spigot’ of the Middle East (Ibid.: 19). The latter, however, 
would suggest clear (US and arguably global) capitalist class interests, even if representing a ‘territorial’ logic. 
Here in our view, Harvey’s opposition between the two logics of power mystify more than that they clarify. 
3  Our neo-Gramscian interpretation as explicated below is next to Jessop (1990) inspired by the so-called 
Amsterdam International Political Economy Project (for an overview see Van Apeldoorn, 2004). 
4 Surprisingly, given the substantial literature on the policy-making power of the US corporate community (e.g., 
Domhoff, 2009), there is only little empirical research on the links between capitalist class interests and US 
foreign policy-making, especially at the level of ‘grand strategy’.  
5 Thus although focusing upon the geopolitical component of hegemonic projects, we still in this article employ 
the concept of hegemonic project as referring to a national programme inasmuch as it is oriented to the 
advancement of dominant class fractions that seek both elite and popular consent within the US –  rather than 
transnational or global – civil society. We thus do not refer to US hegemony as its hegemony within the 
international system or world order, or the extent to which a particular national hegemonic project has also been 
articulated transnationally (cf. Van Apeldoorn, 2004). Through our analysis of the linkages to transnational 
capital we do focus our attention on the transnational constitution of US national projects, but we focus less on 
its transnational effects; although they are part of the changing strategic context that we describe, a more 
comprehensive analysis of these dynamics would merit additional research that falls outside the scope of this 
article.  
6 I.e.: Board of Directors, Founding Members, signatories and contributors to several key advocacy letters and 
reports regarding geopolitical strategy. 
7 Since PNAC affiliation is the selection criterion of the actors, PNAC itself is not included in the analyses and 
graphs, which makes the fact that the network is fully connected and very dense even more significant. 
8  It should be noted that since the selection of affiliations in this study stretches over a longer period, 
interlocking memberships do not necessarily imply direct interaction between the actors. Rather it should be 
interpreted as a shared involvement with a particular ideational legacy, a set of shared ideas and interests, and a 
more general belonging to the broader community with this particular worldview (episteme). Nonetheless there 
have been many instances of direct interaction within the network, as can be seen in Graph 2. 
9 The charting of the actors’ corporate affiliations was not based on a prefixed selection but proceeded in an 
exploratory fashion. Included were e.g. positions at Boards of Directors, Advisory Boards, and CEOs in the 
period 1989 -- 2003. Since there was no opportunity to interview or survey the actors, only those affiliations 
could be included which were actually made public, which might make the selection slightly biased. It seems 
however reasonable to assume that the corporate affiliations that these actors have made public give a robust 
indication of their corporate involvements and allows us to distinguish some broader trends within the network. 
10 For the sector-classification we followed the Center for Responsive Politics (2006), in order to make it 
consistent with data on campaign support. 
11 As a benchmark we took the Fortune 500 notation of the year 2000. 
12 See for overview awarded contracts and grants fiscal years 2003-2004, U.S. Department of State (2006). URL 
(consulted 21 September 2006): http://www.export.gov/iraq/market_ops/contracts.html, for amounts and 
corporations see Center for Public Integrity (2009) Windfalls of War. URL (consulted 27 September 2009): 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/bio.aspx?act=pro. 
13 This policy was effectively put into practice by the US Coalition Provisional Authority under the leadership of 
Paul Bremer, which between 2003-2004 abolished many tariffs on imports, capped corporate and income tax, 
and exposed Iraqi firms to free competition which led to general asset-stripping and the closing down of Iraqi 
firms. 
14 Since membership of the Obama administration was the selection criterion, this affiliation is not included 
separately, membership of the Obama Campaign and the transition teams are however included. 
15 With regard to the high number of interlocks with the Council on Foreign Relations it must be noted that since 
nearly the whole American foreign policy elite has a membership of this Council, this does not convey much 
specific information about this particular network.  
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16 It should be noted that we included both past and present corporate ties, hence it is not argued that the 
corporate ties included here do imply direct conflict of interests. In fact it is common practice to cut all formal 
ties upon accepting a position in the administration. It does however give a clear indication of the corporate 
backdrop and the ‘epistemic community’ of this network. 
17  That the corporate links with the defence sector are less extensive should not necessarily be taken to imply, as 
shall transpire from the next section, that Obama’s strategy is therefore less militaristic. There are also other 
continuities with Bush that one could point to in this context, such as that Obama kept Secretary of Defense, 
Robert Gates at the Pentagon. 
18 This conclusion contrasts for instance with the analysis of Domhoff (2009:188-95) who on the basis of ‘brief 
biographical sketches’ (Ibid.: 192) contends that the Obama Administration appointees differ from former US 
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